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Abstract
We explore the existence of endogenous fluctuations with a rational
bubble and the stabilizing role of fiscal and monetary policies. Consumers’
credit constraints, the role of collateral and a portfolio choice are the
key ingredients of our analysis. We consider an overlapping generations
model where households realize a portfolio choice between three assets
with different returns (capital, money and bonds). Expectation-driven
fluctuations and the multiplicity of steady states occur under a positive
bubble on bonds, gross substitutability and large input substitution be-
cause of credit market imperfections. Focusing on the stabilizing role of
policies, we show that a progressive taxation on capital income may rule
out expectation-driven fluctuations and the multiplicity of steady states.
In contrast, a monetary policy under a Taylor rule has a mitigated sta-
bilizing role, depending on the reactiveness of the policy rule and the
concavity of the utility function. When the monetary authority decides
instead to fix the nominal interest rate regardless the inflation, decrea-
sing the level of the nominal interest rate can rule out expectation-driven
fluctuations, restore the uniqueness of steady states, but can damage the
welfare at the steady state.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, asset prices have experienced large fluctuations, and the finan-
cial sphere of the economy had strong effects on the real one. Some empirical
contributions shed light on the excessive asset price volatility, and reveal that
asset prices fluctuate more than their fundamental value (see Shiller (1981, 1989,
2000), LeRoy and Porter (1981) or Campbell (2003)). One explanation for this
excessive volatility is the existence and the fluctuations of asset bubbles.
Despite the fact that many contributions deal with credit constraints at the
level of entrepreneurs, some empirical studies highlight the existence of credit
constraints faced by consumers underlying the role of collateral on their be-
havior (Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Jappelli (1990), Iacoviello (2004), Crook
and Hochguertel (2005)). Such types of credit market imperfections may be a
source of portfolio choices between different existing assets, like capital, money
and bonds, but also gaps between their returns. We argue that such credit
constraints play a crucial role to explain fluctuations of speculative bubbles,
as illustrated during the recent subprime crisis. We also think that they can
be a main transmission channel between the financial and the real spheres.1
A first aim of this paper is precisely to provide such explanations focusing on
endogenous fluctuations driven by the volatility of agents’ expectations.
Economic fluctuations based on consumer credit constraints also open the
door to new policy tools for stabilizing issues. Since our explanation of expec-
tation-driven fluctuations relies on a trade-off between different assets namely
capital, bonds and money, relevant stabilizing policies are those reducing the
gaps between their returns. Monetary policy appears to be a natural policy
tool, since it affects the opportunity cost of money holdings through the level of
the nominal interest rate. As we focus on the interplay between the real and the
financial spheres, another relevant policy could be one that alters the capital
return. In this perspective, a progressive taxation of capital income could be a
good candidate to dampen the gaps between the returns on physical and mone-
tary assets along the dynamic path. Therefore, the second goal of this paper is
to analyze the stabilizing role of monetary and fiscal policies. More precisely, we
aim to provide new arguments for stabilizing monetary policies when contrary
to most of the literature, the economy experiences bubble fluctuations in an
economy with production (Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Woodford (1999),
Benhabib et al. (2001), Grandmont (1985, 1986), Sorger (2005)). We also pro-
vide new insights in favor of progressive capital income taxation. While some
recent contributions emphasize that nonlinear capital income taxation may be
optimal (Saez (2013), Farhi et al. (2012)), we rather focus on its stabilizing
virtues.
To underline the role of consumers’ credit market imperfections and collat-
eral in an economy with a rational bubble, we consider an otherwise simple
1Only few contributions have analyzed the existence of bubble fluctuations with an inter-
play between the real and the financial spheres of the economy (Michel and Wigniolle (2003,
2005), Kamihigashi (2008), Bosi and Seegmuller (2010a), Wigniolle (2012)). Of course, the
analysis of real effects of bubble fluctuations requires capital accumulation.
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overlapping generations model with two-period lived households and produc-
tion. Households save through bonds, money and capital. Bonds are sold by
the monetary authority to supply money. Because of a binding cash-in-advance
constraint, money is held by households to finance a share of their consump-
tion in the second period of their life. Despite the fact that capital is used
for the production, it also serves as a collateral: holding more capital increases
the amount of collateral, and thus allows each household to reduce the share of
consumption financed through money. It is important to note that the three
assets have different returns. Bonds have larger return than capital because this
latter is used as a collateral to relax the consumers’ credit constraint, and also
a larger return than money because we focus on equilibria with binding con-
straints. As a direct implication, the Fisher relationship is not satisfied.2 The
violation of this relationship will represent some portfolio choices that promote
indeterminacy, and therefore endogenous fluctuations.
We first prove the existence of a steady state characterized by a positive
rational bubble on bonds. Unlike Tirole (1985), any bubbly steady states expe-
rience over-accumulation of capital in the absence of capital taxation. In con-
trast to several existing papers (Farmer (1986), Benhabib and Laroque (1988),
Rochon and Polemarchakis (2006)), expectation-driven fluctuations occur in
the neighborhood of a steady state with a positive rational asset bubble un-
der gross substitutability and reasonable values of input substitution, without
requiring arbitrarily large increasing returns to scale (Cazzavillan and Pintus
(2005), Azariadis and Reichlin (1996)). This result is obtained when the share
of consumption purchased on credit weakly depends on collateral, but is suffi-
ciently concave. Interestingly, this result is connected to a multiplicity of steady
states, i.e. a form of global indeterminacy.
In a second step, we discuss the stabilizing role of fiscal and monetary poli-
cies. As discussed earlier, we introduce a progressive taxation of capital income,
used to finance useless public spendings under a balanced budget. We show that
increasing the degree of marginal progressivity may rule out expectation-driven
fluctuations under gross substitutability by reducing the range of parameters
for indeterminacy and for the multiplicity of steady states. This fiscal policy
is therefore powerful to stabilize endogenous fluctuations. Contrary to previ-
ous contributions (see for instance Guo and Lansing (1998)), progressive capital
income taxation is per se stabilizing through a new mechanism based on the
portfolio choice between the different assets and on the gaps between their re-
turns.
We pursue the analysis with the monetary policy, and investigate whether
such a policy can have similar stabilizing virtues as fiscal policy. We first con-
sider that the nominal interest rate is determined according to a Taylor rule on
expected inflation. In this case, the results are mitigated. A weakly active or
passive rule can even promote endogenous fluctuations for some relevant para-
meter configurations. In addition, such a policy has no effect on the multiplicity
2The Fisher relationship means that the gross real interest rate is equal to the gross nominal
interest rate deflated by the gross inflation rate.
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of steady states. One explanation is that such a rule does not strongly modify
the nominal interest rate, and therefore does not alter so much the portfolio
choice.
Therefore, we focus on an alternative monetary policy that more directly
affects the nominal interest rate. A monetary policy that fixes the level of the
nominal interest rate independently on expected inflation, like an interest rate
pegging, is a relevant stabilization tool. In this case, under gross substitutability
local indeterminacy and the multiplicity of steady states can be eliminated by
implementing a sufficiently low interest rate. Hence, the monetary policy based
on the direct management of the interest rate independently on expected infla-
tion appears to be powerful to stabilize endogenous business cycles and global
indeterminacy associated to the multiplicity of steady states. Note that this is
in accordance with Rochon and Polemarchakis (2006), but in contrast to them
we stabilize fluctuations with a positive bubble.
To summarize, in contrast to a Taylor rule, a progressive taxation of capital
income and a direct management of the interest rate are powerful to stabilize
the economy which experiences a positive rational bubble. We however show
that capital taxation may reduce or even rule out over-accumulation of capital,
while the stabilizing effect of a direct management of the interest rate implies a
deterioration of the welfare at the stationary equilibrium.3
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the model.
The intertemporal equilibrium is defined in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the
steady state analysis. In Section 5, we analyze the occurrence of expectation-
driven fluctuations when there is a positive bubble. In Section 6, we study the
stabilizing role of fiscal vs. monetary policy. Concluding remarks are provided
in Section 7, and all the proofs are gathered in a final Appendix.
2 The model
In this paper, we consider an overlapping generations model with production in
discrete time (t = 0, 1, ...,+∞). This economy consists of identical two period-
lived households, firms, a monetary authority, a government and four goods: a
final good, productive capital, money and a bond.
2.1 Households
There is no population growth, and at each date t, a generation of unit size is
born and lives for two periods.
A household derives utility from consumption when young (ct) and old
(dt+1). Her preferences are represented by an additively separable life-cycle
utility function:
u (ct) + βv (dt+1) =
c1−εut
1− εu + β
d1−εvt+1
1− εv , β > 0 (1)
3In this case, we lose the Friedman rule.
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ct and dt+1 denote respectively the consumption of final good in the first and
second period of life. εu > 0 and εv > 0 are the degrees of concavity of u (ct)
and v (dt+1). We further note that εv < 1 implies gross substitutability meaning
that savings are an increasing function of the global return on portfolio.4
In her first period of life, the household is young and supplies one unit
of labor inelastically remunerated at the wage wt. With this wage, she can
consume an amount ct of final good at price pt, and save through a diversified
portfolio of productive capital per capita kt+1 (with rental factor Rt+1), nominal
bonds Bt+1 (with nominal interest rate it+1) and nominal balances Mt+1 needed
for a transaction motive. In her second period of life, she is old. She uses
her remunerated savings and her monetary transfer ∆t+1 from the monetary
authority to purchase an amount dt+1 of final good at price pt+1 and to pay a
tax on her capital income. Defining g(Rt+1kt+1) as the after-tax capital income
of a household, the first and second-period budget constraints are written as
follows:
ptct +Mt+1 +Bt+1 + ptkt+1 ≤ ptwt (2)
pt+1dt+1 ≤ Mt+1 + (1 + it+1)Bt+1
+pt+1g(Rt+1kt+1) + ∆t+1 (3)
Considering a progressive taxation of capital income, we assume:
Assumption 1 Let yk ≡ Rk. The function g(yk): [0,+∞) → [0,+∞) is
continuous, with g(0) = 0, and C2 on (0,+∞). In addition, it satisfies 0 <
g′(yk) ≤ 1 and g′′(yk) ≤ 0 for all yk > 0. We define ρ1 (yk) ≡ yk g
′(yk)
g(yk)
∈ (0, 1)
and ρ2 (yk) ≡ −yk g
′′(yk)
g′(yk)
≥ 0 as the first and second order elasticities of after-tax
capital income respectively.
The after-tax capital income g(yk) > 0 is increasing, concave and satisfies
g(yk) ≤ yk. Assumption 1 implies that the tax function τ(yk) ≡ yk − g(yk) ≥ 0
is non-decreasing and convex. In addition, the marginal tax rate τm(yk) ≡
1− g′(yk) ∈ (0, 1) is increasing in the tax base as ρ2(yk) > 0 and flat as ρ2 = 0.
We note that the elasticity ρ2(yk) is a measure of marginal progressivity.
5
4As we will see below, the consumer problem has the following structure:
max
c1−εut
1− εu
+ β
d1−εvt+1
1− εv
st. ct + st = wt
dt+1 = R˜t+1st + ∆t+1,
where st represents global savings of a household, R˜t+1 the global return on her portfolio, wt,
her labor income and ∆t+1 a monetary transfer. From this problem, we obtain:
dst
dR˜t+1
R˜t+1
st
=
1− εvR˜t+1st/(R˜t+1st + ∆t+1)
εust/(wt − st) + εvR˜t+1st/(R˜t+1st + ∆t+1)
,
which is positive for εv < 1.
5As ρ1 = 1 and ρ2 = 0, no progressive taxation of capital income is implemented.
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Furthermore, at the second period of life, the household has to pay cash a
part of the second period consumption dt+1: her money demand is rationalized
by a cash-in-advance constraint. We use the constraint introduced by Hahn
and Solow (1995), i.e. γpt+1dt+1 ≤ Mt+1, but extend it to take into account
collateral:
γ(kt+1)pt+1dt+1 ≤ Mt+1 (4)
Assumption 2 γ (k) ∈ (0, 1) is a continuous function defined on [0,+∞), C2
on (0,+∞), decreasing (γ′ (k) ≤ 0). In addition, we define:
η1 (k) ≡ [1− γ (k)]
′
k
1− γ (k) = −
γ′(k)k
1− γ(k) ≥ 0, (5)
η2 (k) ≡ − [1− γ (k)]
′′
k
[1− γ (k)]′ = −
γ′′(k)k
γ′(k)
(6)
For instance, the following function satisfies these properties:
γ(k) =
A
s
exp(−sk), (7)
with 0 < A < s. Using this example, η1(k) and η2(k) are given by:
η1(k) =
A exp(−sk)
1− As exp(−sk)
k ≥ 0 and η2(k) = sk > 0
A binding cash-in-advance constraint means that the household has to pay
cash, i.e. with her nominal balances Mt+1, a share γ(kt+1) ∈ (0, 1) of her
second period consumption. Since the household holds Bt+1 + pt+1kt+1 when
young, she can consume on credit when old. Indeed, the household knows that
in addition to the transfer from the monetary authority ∆t+1/pt+1, she will
have (1 + it+1)Bt+1/pt+1 + g(Rt+1kt+1) at the next period. As a result, she can
consume this amount on credit. In other words, the remaining share 1−γ(kt+1)
of her second period consumption can be financed by borrowing from a bank or
a financial institution an amount equal to her remunerated savings from capital
and bonds plus her monetary transfer, i.e. (1 + it+1)Bt+1/pt+1 + g(Rt+1kt+1) +
∆t+1/pt+1, that she will pay back at the end of her second period of life. In the
following, we refer to 1− γ(kt+1) as the credit share.
In addition, we assume that the amount of productive capital held by the
household affects her cash-in-advance constraint. Capital acts as a collateral
for the household: holding more capital in her portfolio allows the household
to increase her opportunities to obtain credit from the bank or the financial
institution, and to reduce her need of cash in her second period of life. This
assumption is a simple manner to include some credit market imperfections and
a collateral effect in our framework.
Notice that when collateral does not matter (η1 (kt+1) = 0), and γ tends
to 0, money is no longer needed and the credit market distortion disappears.
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However, when γ > 0, there is a need of cash. When collateral matters
(η1 (kt+1) > 0), the households are aware of the credit share function. By
increasing capital holdings, they are able to reduce the share of consumption
financed through cash.
Using pit+1 ≡ pt+1pt and introducing the real variables mt+1 ≡
Mt+1
pt+1
, bt+1 ≡
Bt+1
pt+1
and δt+1 ≡ ∆t+1pt+1 , the constraints (2)-(4) can be rewritten as follows:
ct + pit+1mt+1 + pit+1bt+1 + kt+1 ≤ wt (8)
dt+1 ≤ mt+1 + (1 + it+1) bt+1
+g(Rt+1kt+1) + δt+1 (9)
γ (kt+1) dt+1 ≤ mt+1 (10)
The representative household derives her optimal consumption choice (ct,
dt+1) and her optimal portfolio choice (kt+1,mt+1, bt+1) by maximizing her
utility function (1) under her budget and cash-in-advance constraints (8)−(10).
Assumption 3 Let ε˜u ≡ c1 + i
pi
[iη1 (1− γ)]2
{ρ1ρ2g + [iη1 (1− γ)] η2d} (1 + iγ)2
.6 For all
t ≥ 0, we assume it > 0, η2 > 0 and εu > ε˜u.7
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions 1-3, constraints (8)-(10) are binding and the
second-order conditions are satisfied.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 1 requires that the function of the credit share 1 − γ(kt+1) is con-
cave: capital holdings increase, at a decreasing rate, the part of second-period
consumption purchased on credit. Moreover, the cash-in-advance constraint is
binding if the nominal interest rate it+1 is strictly positive (it+1 > 0).
Under Assumptions 1-3, the optimal households’ behavior is summarized by
the following equations:
u′(ct)
βv′(dt+1)
=
1 + it+1
pit+1
1
1 + it+1γ(kt+1)
(11)
Rt+1g
′(Rt+1kt+1) =
1 + it+1
pit+1
− it+1η1(kt+1)1− γ(kt+1)
kt+1
dt+1 (12)
When collateral does not matter (η1(k) = 0), and no progressive capital
income taxation is implemented (g′(Rk) = 1), Eqs. (11) and (12) rewrite:
u′(ct)
βv′(dt+1)
=
(1 + it+1)/pit+1
1 + it+1γ
(13a) and Rt+1 =
1 + it+1
pit+1
(13b)
6For simplicity, the arguments of the functions and the time subscripts are omitted.
7This general condition will be supposed satisfied at the steady state.
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We can note that as γ tends to 0, we obtain the intertemporal trade-off
found in Diamond (1965) and Tirole (1985), where there are no credit market
distortions in the economy (see Eq. (13a)). As γ > 0, a distortion exists: old
households now have to pay cash γ in order to consume an additional unit of
final good, and money entails an opportunity cost. Nevertheless, when collateral
does not matter, capital and bonds are perfect substitutes (see Eq. (13b)).
When collateral matters (η1(k) > 0), capital and bonds are no longer perfect
substitutes. Indeed, households can now decrease their need of cash by holding
more capital in their portfolio. As a consequence, the return on capital is lower
than the return on bonds.8 In contrast, a positive marginal tax rate on capital
income has an opposite effect by reducing capital holdings. The endogeneity of
the credit share ensures the portfolio choices to be no longer constant through
time. The trade-off between assets is endogenous, and depends on the amount of
collateral held by the households, involving the existence of a “portfolio effect”.
A change in expected inflation leads to reconsider the trade-off between asset
holdings. Later, we will see that this portfolio effect is a key mechanism through
which expectation-driven fluctuations may occur. As the portfolio choices are
an explanation for fluctuations, we will focus on stabilizing policies that are
able to modify the different returns of assets, and therefore, to counteract the
portfolio effect. In this perspective, we will consider a taxation of capital income
for the fiscal policy, then an interest rate rule and an interest rate pegging for
the monetary policy.
2.2 Firms
A representative competitive firm produces the final good using capital and
labor under a constant returns to scale technology f (K/L)L. Since we note
k = K/L, the intensive production function f (k) satisfies:
Assumption 4 f (k) is a continuous function defined on [0,+∞) and C2 on
(0,+∞), strictly increasing (f ′ (k) > 0) and strictly concave (f ′′ (k) < 0).
Defining α(k) ≡ f ′(k)k/f(k) ∈ (0, 1) as the capital share in total income and
σ(k) ≡ [f ′ (k) k/f (k)− 1] f ′ (k) / [kf ′′ (k)] > 0 as the elasticity of capital-labor
substitution, we further assume f ′(1) < 1, limk→0+ f ′ (k) > 1 and σ(k) >
1− α(k).
8For η1 (kt+1) <
γ (kt+1)
1− γ (kt+1)
kt+1
pit+1mt+1
, the following inequality is satisfied:
1
pit+1
< Rt+1g
′(Rt+1kt+1) <
1 + it+1
pit+1
(14)
In ascending order, there are the return on money, on capital and on bonds. When the role of
collateral is not so large, money is a dominated asset. As capital allows households to reduce
the tightness of the cash-in-advance constraint, a sufficiently large η1(k) can imply a return
on capital lower than the return on money.
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The competitive firm takes the prices as given and maximizes the profits
f (Kt/Lt)Lt − wtLt −RtKt9:
Rt = f
′ (kt) ≡ R (kt) (15)
wt = f (kt)− ktf ′ (kt) ≡ w (kt) (16)
Hence, the interest rate and wage elasticities are respectively equal to R(k) ≡
R′(k)k
R(k) = − 1−α(k)σ(k) and w(k) ≡ w
′(k)k
w(k) =
α(k)
σ(k) . The inequality σ(k) > 1 − α(k)
involves capital income Rtkt being increasing in kt, which is not a restrictive
assumption.
2.3 Monetary authority
For implementing monetary policy, the monetary authority (central bank) uses
open market operations defined as the purchase or sale of bonds in exchange
for nominal balances.10 At time t, the central bank creates nominal balances
Mt+1, which offer liquidity at the next period t+1.
11 The money growth factor
µt = Mt+1/Mt can be written as follows:
µt = pit+1
mt+1
mt
(17)
In order to supply Mt+1 in the economy at t + 1, the central bank buys
bonds from old households, and pays for them in cash through open market
operations. As a consequence, a part of bonds held by the old households B¯t+1
corresponds to the counterpart of second period nominal balances Mt+1:
B¯t+1 +Mt+1 = 0 (18)
At time t, the central bank sells bonds Bt+1 and nominal balances Mt+1
to young households, and buys bonds with interests (1 + it)Bt and nominal
balances Mt from old households. The profits made by central bank ∆t at time
t are given by:
∆t = Bt+1 +Mt+1 − (1 + it)Bt −Mt (19)
As bonds are the counterpart of money, we obtain ∆t = itMt. These profits
are distributed as dividends to the old households at time t. Thus, the budget
constraint of the monetary authority at time t is written as follows:
Bt+1 +Mt+1 = (1 + it)Bt +Mt + ∆t = (1 + it)(Bt +Mt) (20)
or equivalently:
pit+1(bt+1 +mt+1) = (1 + it)(bt +mt) (21)
9We assume a full capital depreciation within a period.
10To study the existence of expectation-driven fluctuations in an overlapping generations
model without collateral, Rochon and Polemarchakis (2006) use similar open market opera-
tions for supplying money in the economy.
11Placing a part of their savings in the form of nominal balances in their first period of life,
young households will have the opportunity to obtain liquidity in their second period of life.
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Let θt ≡ (1 + it)(bt + mt). When θt = 0, all bonds are the counterpart of
money. In this case, all money in the economy corresponds to inside money.
When θt > 0, a positive bubble on bonds exists. Indeed, θt > 0 is equivalent
to bt − b¯t > 0, where bt represents the market value of bonds and b¯t the real
counterpart of money. When θt < 0, there is an excess of households’ debt
(θt < 0 ⇔ bt − b¯t < 0), in other words a negative bubble. Thus, Eq. (21) can
be rewritten as follows:
pit+1θt+1 = (1 + it+1)θt (22)
In addition, the monetary authority chooses the nominal interest rate it+1
as the monetary instrument, and implements the following interest rate rule:
1 + it+1 = (1 + i
∗)
(pit+1
pi∗
)φ
, (23)
where φ ≥ 0 is a measure of monetary policy responses to expected inflation.
Furthermore, i∗ and pi∗ are respectively the stationary values of the nominal
interest rate and the inflation of an existing stationary equilibrium chosen as
the targets by the monetary authority.
When φ = 0, the central bank decides to fix the level of the nominal interest
rate at its stationary level i∗. When φ > 0, Eq. (23) depicts an interest rate rule,
like a Taylor rule, which responds to expected inflation.12 For φ ∈ (0, 1), the
rule weakly reacts to expected inflation: an increase (decrease) in the inflation
raises (depresses) the nominal interest rate less than proportionally, involving a
decrease (increase) in the real interest rate. For φ > 1, the rule strongly reacts to
expected inflation: an increase (decrease) in the inflation raises (depresses) the
nominal interest rate more than proportionally, involving an increase (decrease)
in the real interest rate. Following Benhabib et al. (2001), we define a rule with
φ ∈ (0, 1) as a passive one, and a rule with φ > 1 as an active one.
2.4 Government
Taxes on capital income are used to finance wasteful public expenditures Gt.
These public expenditures affect neither households’ preferences nor the pro-
duction function. Government budget is balanced at each period, that is:
Gt = τ(Rtkt) = Rtkt − g(Rtkt) (24)
Note that we could have one institution by introducing a single budget con-
straint for the government and the monetary authority such that there is no
deficit, i.e. Gt+(1+it)Bt+Mt+∆t = Rtkt−g(Rtkt)+Bt+1+Mt+1. This would
be perfectly equivalent to our framework. θt would still be a non-predetermined
variable since it would be deflated by the price.
12From Bernanke (2010), a rule which responds to expected inflation is more relevant to des-
cribe the US monetary policy than a rule responding to observed inflation. As a consequence,
we consider a Taylor rule involving an interest rate response to inflation forecast.
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3 Intertemporal equilibrium
At the intertemporal equilibrium, the budget and cash-in-advance constraints
of households are given by:
ct +
pit+1
1 + it+1
θt+1 + kt+1 = w(kt) (25)
dt+1 = θt+1 + g(f
′(kt+1)kt+1) (26)
γ(kt+1)dt+1 = mt+1 (27)
The budget constraints of the monetary authority and the government are as
follows:
pit+1 = (1 + it+1)
θt
θt+1
(28)
Gt+1 = f
′(kt+1)kt+1 − g(f ′(kt+1)kt+1) (29)
Substituting Eq. (28) into the first-period budget constraint Eq. (25), we deter-
mine:
ct + θt + kt+1 = w(kt) (30)
Using Eqs. (17), (27) and (28), we deduce the money growth factor:
µt = (1 + it+1)
θt
θt+1
γ(kt+1)
γ(kt)
θt+1 + g(f
′(kt+1)kt+1)
θt + g(f ′(kt)kt)
(31)
Substituting Eqs. (25) and (30) into Eq. (11), then Eqs. (26) and (28) into Eq.
(12), the consumers’ intertemporal trade-off and the no-arbitrage condition are
respectively given by:
θt
u′(f(kt)− f ′(kt)kt − θt − kt+1)
βv′(θt+1 + g(f ′(kt+1)kt+1))
=
θt+1
1 + it+1γ(kt+1)
θt+1
θt
=
1 + it+1
pit+1
= f ′(kt+1)g′(f ′(kt+1)kt+1)H(kt+1, θt),
(32)
with H(kt+1, θt) ≡ 1 + it+1η1(kt+1) [1− γ(kt+1)] [ρ1(f
′(kt+1)kt+1)]
−1
1− θtit+1η1(kt+1) [1− γ(kt+1)] /kt+1 (33)
When collateral does not matter (η1(k) = 0), we obtain H(kt+1, θt) = 1.
Therefore, the Fisher equation ((1 + it+1)/pit+1 = f
′(kt+1)) holds at the in-
tertemporal equilibrium as soon as there is no progressive taxation on capital
income (g′(f ′(kt+1)kt+1) = 1). This means that the return on real asset (ca-
pital) is equal to the return on nominal asset (bonds) deflated by the inflation
factor. The presence of collateral (η1(k) > 0) implies the violation of the Fisher
equation (H(kt+1, θt) > 1). As capital serves as a collateral, its return becomes
lower than the real return on bonds (f ′(kt+1) < (1 + it+1)/pit+1)). We will see
11
later that this violation of the Fisher equation represents some portfolio choices
that promote indeterminacy, a source of expectation-driven fluctuations.
Since the portfolio choices are key ingredients for the existence of fluctua-
tions, we will focus on policies that can alter it. As regards fiscal policy, we
consider a progressive taxation on capital income g′(f ′(kt+1)kt+1) < 1. Indeed,
such a fiscal policy can cancel out the collateral effect (see (32)). Interestingly,
the level of nominal interest rate can also offset the collateral effect (see Eq.
(33)). Thus, considering a usual interest rate rule, like a Taylor one, but also
an alternative, like an interest rate pegging, are a priori relevant to study the
stabilizing role of monetary policy.
From the budget constraint of the monetary authority Eq. (28) and the
monetary rule Eq. (23), we deduce that:
pit+1
pi∗
=
(
θt
θt+1
) 1
1−φ
(34)
Substituting Eq. (34) into Eq. (23), we obtain the nominal interest rate at the
equilibrium:
it+1 = (1 + i
∗)
(
θt
θt+1
)aφ
− 1, where aφ ≡ φ
1− φ ∈ (−∞,−1) ∪ [0,+∞) (35)
Definition 1 Under Assumptions 1-4, an intertemporal equilibrium with per-
fect foresight is a sequence (kt, θt) ∈ R2+, t = 0, 1, ...,+∞, such that (32) is
satisfied, where it+1 is defined by Eq. (35) and k(0) > 0 is given.
Taking into account that it+1 is given by Eq. (35), we note that kt is the
only predetermined variable of this two-dimensional dynamic system (32). The
intertemporal sequence of kt and θt enables us to determine all the other vari-
ables, namely ct, dt, mt and bt. In particular, the dynamics of mt and bt are
given by Eqs. (27) and (28) respectively.
4 Steady state analysis
From the system (32), we deduce that two kinds of steady state exist: θ = 0
and θ 6= 0. Since we are interested in fluctuations with a positive bubble, we
will focus on steady states with θ 6= 0. A steady state is a solution (k, θ) ∈ R2++
that satisfies the following system:
u′(f(k)− f ′(k)k − k − θ)
βv′(θ + g(f ′(k)k))
=
1
1 + i∗γ(k)
f ′(k)g′(f ′(k)k)H(k, θ) = 1
(36)
with H(k, θ) =
1 + i∗η1(k) [1− γ(k)] [ρ1(f ′(k)k)]−1
1− θi∗η1(k) [1− γ(k)] /k (37)
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Under a constant credit share (η1(k) = 0), we see from the system (36)
that the steady state is unique, and the monetary policy does not affect the
production side. Indeed, the second equation of the system (36) reduces to
f ′(k)g′(f ′(k)k) = 1. When collateral matters (η1(k) > 0), the superneutrality
of money is canceled. Because of the presence of collateral, the monetary sphere
affects the real one.
4.1 Existence
From Eq. (36), a steady state with θ 6= 0 is a solution k ∈ R+ satisfying:

u′ (c(k))
βv′ (d(k))
=
1
1 + i∗γ(k)
θ =
1− ψ(k){1 + i∗η1(k)[1− γ(k)][ρ1(f ′(k)k)]−1}
i∗η1(k)[1− γ(k)]/k
(38)
with c(k) = f(k)− k − k[1− ψ(k)]
i∗η1(k)[1− γ(k)] − [kf
′(k)− g(f ′(k)k)] ,
d(k) =
k[1− ψ(k)]
i∗η1(k)[1− γ(k)] and ψ(k) = f
′(k)g′(f ′(k)k).
From these equations, we deduce that d(k) > 0 implies ψ(k) < 1, and from
Eqs. (28) and (31), 1 + i∗ = pi = µ > 1.
Proposition 1 Let k defined by c
(
k
)
= 0 and k by ψ(k) = 1. Under As-
sumptions 1-4, there exists a steady state characterized by −g(f ′(k∗)k)∗ < θ∗ <
f(k∗)− k∗ − f ′(k∗)k∗ and k∗ ∈ (k, k). A positive bubble, i.e. θ∗ > 0, requires:
[1− ψ(k∗)] k
∗
g(f ′(k∗)k∗)
> i∗η1(k∗) [1− γ(k∗)] (39)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 1 indicates that a positive bubble on bonds exists at the steady
state. Furthermore, the condition (39) is satisfied for small η1.
When there is no taxation (g′(f ′(k)k) = 1) and collateral does not matter
(η1(k) = 0), we can see from Eq. (37) that the steady state is at the golden
rule (R(k) = 1). As the well-known result of Tirole (1985), a positive rational
asset bubble crowds out capital. When collateral matters (η1(k) > 0), our
economy experiences an over-accumulation of capital at the steady state (R(k) <
1). The existence of collateral incites households to hold more capital in their
portfolio in order to relax the cash-in-advance constraint, and therefore, the
capital return decreases. On the contrary, a taxation on capital income incites
households to reduce capital accumulation. As long as there are some credit
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market imperfections, implementing a tax on capital income can counteract the
collateral effect, and thus reduce or even rule out over-accumulation of capital.
As regards the monetary policy, we recall that the central bank chooses the
stationary values of an existing steady state for its targets. Since, the steady
state k∗ persists, we assume that the central bank selects this steady state, and
therefore, pi∗ = 1 + i∗.
4.2 Normalized steady state and multiplicity
In order to facilitate the analysis of local dynamics (Sections 5 and 6), we
establish the existence of a normalized steady state k∗ = 1 (NSS). We follow
the procedure introduced by Cazzavillan et al. (1998), and use the scaling
parameter β to give conditions for the existence of such a steady state.
Assumption 5 Let ν(η1) = i
∗η1(1) [1− γ(1)], we assume:
f(1)− f ′(1) + g(f ′(1)) > 1 + 1− ψ
ν(η1)
Assumption 5 ensures that the first period consumption at the normalized steady
state is positive (i.e. c(1) > 0), and it is satisfied when the productivity is
sufficiently large.13
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1-5, there exists a unique value β∗ > 0
given by
β∗ =
u′
(
f(1)− 1− 1− ψ(1)
ν(η1)
− [f ′(1)− g (f ′(1))]
)
v′
(
1− ψ(1)
ν(η1)
) [1 + i∗γ (1)]
such that k∗ = 1 is a steady state of the dynamic system (32). Assumption 5
ensures that k∗ = 1 ∈ (k, k). Moreover, there is a positive bubble (θ∗ > 0) if
1− ψ(1)− g(f ′(1))ν(η1) > 0.
Thereafter, we set β = β∗ so that k∗ = 1. We further note c∗ ≡ c(1), γ ≡ γ(1),
η1 ≡ η1 (1), η2 ≡ η2 (1), g ≡ g(f ′(1)), ρ1 ≡ ρ1(1), ρ2 ≡ ρ2(1), ψ ≡ ψ(1),
α = α(1) and σ = σ(1). At the normalized steady state, the second-order
conditions are satisfied for εu > ε˜u, with ε˜u ≡ c∗ ν(η1)
2
[ρ2ψ + η2 (1− ψ)] (1 + i∗γ)2
(see Assumption 3). We can now clarify the conditions for the multiplicity of
steady states.14
13As an example, we can consider f(k) = A˜
(
αk
σ−1
σ + 1− α
) σ
σ−1
. Assumption 5 is satisfied
for A˜ > 0 large enough.
14We note εJxi the elasticity of the function J(x1, ..., xn) with respect to xi, i.e. εJxi =
∂J(x1,...,xn)
∂xi
xi
J(x1,...,xn)
.
14
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 1-5, there exists a value εsv such that there
is a multiplicity of bubbly stationary equilibria if the following condition holds15:
εv <
Ω
εdk
(
εsu
c∗
− εu
c∗
)
≡ εsv
Their number is generically odd.
Proof. See Appendix B.
As Clain-Chamosset-Yvrard and Seegmuller (2012), the multiplicity of steady
states appears only when degrees of concavity are small enough (εu < ε
s
u and
εv < ε
s
v). Because the second-order conditions are satisfied for εu > ε˜u, then
εsu > ε˜u must be satisfied. This holds true for η1 small enough and η2 large
enough.16 This multiplicity implies the existence of several steady states with
positive bubble (i.e. θ∗ > 0). From the second equation of (38), we can check
that the size of the bubble at the steady state is increasing in the stationary ca-
pital stock. Through the collateral effect, an increase in stationary capital stock
implies a decrease in stationary nominal balances, which entails a reallocation
of savings towards the bubble.
We can consider the existence of multiple stationary equilibria as a form
of global indeterminacy, which is a source of expectation-driven fluctuations
of the bubble. We will see later that this multiplicity is connected with local
indeterminacy, and that a sufficiently progressive fiscal policy or a low interest
rate target can remove the multiplicity of steady states by reducing the range
of parameters for the existence of this multiplicity.17
5 Expectation-driven fluctuations
Considering a framework with an interplay between the financial and the real
spheres, this paper first aims to explain business fluctuations in presence of a
speculative bubble. The violation of the Fisher relationship and the resulting
portfolio choice between bonds, capital and money are the key ingredients to
explain these fluctuations. In this section, we show that the steady state with
a positive bubble on bonds can be locally indeterminate, and therefore, fluctu-
ations driven by agents’ self-fulfilling expectations can emerge. In particular,
local indeterminacy occurs in the neighborhood of the normalized steady state
with a positive bubble under gross substitutability and a not too weak input
substitution because of credit market distortions.
15The expressions of Ω, εdk and ε
s
u are given in Appendix B.
16εsu > ε˜u is satisfied if and only if η2(1 − ψ)i∗γ >
i∗η1 (1− γ)
{
1− f ′(1) + (1− 1−α
σ
)
[f ′(1)− ψ]} + ψ 1−α
σ
− ψρ2
(
1−α
σ
+ i∗γ
)
.
17Benhabib et al (2001) show however that monetary policies could have adverse effects
according to the steady state of the economy.
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5.1 Local dynamics: preliminaries
To derive our different results, we start by linearizing the dynamic system (32)
around the normalized steady state k∗ = 1 to obtain the characteristic polyno-
mial. As shown in Appendix C.1, we can derive the trace T (εv) and the de-
terminant D(εv) of the associated Jacobian matrix as functions of εv
18: D(εv)
linearly depends on T (εv). As a result, we can apply the geometrical method
developed by Grandmont et al. (1998) to discuss the local stability properties
of the model.
We study the variations of the trace T (εv) and the determinant D (εv) in the
(T,D) plane as εv is made to vary continuously in its admissible range (0,+∞).
The locus Σ ≡ {(T (εv) , D (εv)): εv ≥ 0} describes a part of a line that we call
the Σ-line.
Consider the (T,D) plane (see Figure 1). On line (AC), one eigenvalue is
equal to 1 (D = T − 1). On line (AB), one eigenvalue is equal to −1 (D =
−T − 1). Along segment [BC] (|T | < 2, D = 1), the characteristic roots are
complex conjugates with modulus equal to 1. These lines and this segment
divide the space (T,D) into three different types of regions. Inside the triangle
ABC, the steady state is a sink, i.e. locally indeterminate (|T | < 1 + D and
D < 1). It is a saddle point if (T,D) lies on the right or left sides of both the
lines (AB) and (AC) (|1 +D| < |T |). It is a source otherwise.
A (local) bifurcation arises when at least one eigenvalue crosses the unit
circle, that is, when the Σ-line crosses one of the loci (AB), (AC) or [BC].
According to the changes of the bifurcation parameter, a pitchfork bifurcation
(generically) emerges when the Σ-line crosses (AC), as εv goes through ε
s
v.
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A flip bifurcation (generically) occurs when the Σ-line crosses (AB), as εv goes
through εfv . Finally, a Hopf bifurcation (generically) arises when the Σ-line
crosses the segment [BC], as εv goes through ε
h
v .
We locate the Σ-line in the (T,D) plane by analyzing (T (0), D(0)), (T (+∞),
D(+∞)) and its slope S (see Appendix C.2). This allows us to analyze the
occurrence of local indeterminacy and endogenous cycles.
5.2 Fluctuations with a bubble
In this section, we show that expectation-driven fluctuations with a positive
bubble on bonds may occur not only under large degrees of utility concavity,
but also for arbitrarily small ones. Furthermore, the occurrence of fluctuations
under gross substitutability is connected to a multiplicity of steady states, i.e.
a form of global indeterminacy.
To highlight fluctuations with a bubble, we consider that the central bank
fixes the nominal interest rate to a constant one i∗ (φ = 0), and no fiscal policy
is implemented (g(Rk) = Rk). Furthermore, we limit our analysis to the case
in which η1 is arbitrarily small to have a positive bubble (see Section 4.1).
18See Lemma 3 in Appendix C.1.
19Indeed, we have (generically) an odd number of steady states (see Section 4.2).
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Assumption 6 η1 is arbitrarily small, and η2 is arbitrarily large.
Illustration. The function γ(k) given by Eq.(7) in Section 2.1 satisfies As-
sumption 6: η1 is sufficiently small and η2 is arbitrarily large at the normalized
steady state for s large enough.
Local dynamics are studied through geometrical arguments, while technical
details are relegated to Appendix C.2. To locate the Σ-line in the (T,D) plane,
we first note that the value of the starting point (T (0), D(0)) is such that the
Σ-line starts on the left-side of (AC) and inside the triangle ABC when εu < ε
s
u
and on the right-side of (AC) when εu > ε
s
u. The endpoint (T (+∞), D (+∞))
lies on the horizontal axis. More precisely, it is inside the triangle ABC with
T (+∞) ∈ (−1, 0).
Whatever the degree of utility concavity εu, we can prove that under As-
sumptions 1 − 6, the Σ-line has a slope S ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, the determinant
D(εv) and the trace T (εv) are increasing in εv, and the bifurcation values are
such that:
εsv < ε
h
v < ε
f
v , (40)
As a consequence, we can deduce that the Σ-line goes below the point C. Fur-
thermore, we can easily check that εsv < 1 and ε
h
v > 1 under Assumptions 1− 6.
As a result, when εu < ε
s
u, the Σ-line starts inside the triangle ABC, crosses
(AC) below C, then (AB) between A and B, and ends inside the triangle ABC
at (T (+∞),D (+∞)) on the horizontal axis. When εu > εsu, the configuration is
similar, except that the Σ-line starts outside the triangle ABC on the right-side
of (AC).
Proposition 4 Under Assumptions 1-6, the following generically holds:
1. When εu ∈ (ε˜u, εsu), the steady state is a sink for εv < εsv < 1, undergoes a
pitchfork bifurcation for εv = ε
s
v, is a saddle for εv ∈
(
εsv, ε
f
v
)
, undergoes
a flip bifurcation for εv = ε
f
v , and is a sink for εv > ε
f
v .
2. When εu > ε
s
u, the steady state is a saddle for εv < ε
f
v , undergoes a flip
bifurcation for εv = ε
f
v , and is a sink for εv > ε
f
v .
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
Proposition 4 shows the occurrence of persistent endogenous fluctuations
around the steady state with a positive bubble under gross substitutability and
a not too weak capital-labor substitution. This result extends Bosi and Seeg-
muller (2010a) and Clain-Chamosset-Yvrard and Seegmuller (2012) to a model
with inside money.20 In addition, it is important to note that the occurrence
20In these two papers, the stabilizing role of policies is not addressed in the same way as
here. Indeed, the fiscal policy is ignored and the monetary authority directly manages the
money growth factor, while it fixes the interest rate in our framework.
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Figure 1: Fluctutations of a bubble
of fluctuations under gross substitutability is connected to the multiplicity of
steady states (see Proposition 3).
When collateral does not matter (η1 = 0), the local stability properties
of the model correspond to Proposition 4.2. Our model exhibits endogenous
fluctuations and two-period cycles only for large degrees of concavity on u(c) and
v(d), i.e. for a significant income effect.21 More interestingly, when collateral
matters (η1 > 0), local indeterminacy also appears for small degrees of concavity
on u(c) and v(d), in particular under gross substitutability (εv < ε
s
v < 1).
The basic mechanism for fluctuations under gross substitutability relies on
a portfolio trade-off between the three assets. Because of the difference between
the returns on physical and monetary assets: a reallocation between the assets
takes place following a modification in agents’ expectations.
Economic intuition. If households expect an increase in inflation from
period t to t+ 1, the return on bonds becomes less attractive compared to the
return on capital. Because of the portfolio effect, households reallocate their
savings towards capital. As a consequence, when εv < ε
s
v < 1, the portfolio
effect can accelerate capital accumulation. Households consume less by cash (see
Eq. (27)). The real balances mt+1 decrease, entailing a decrease in the return
21Since εv > ε
f
v > 1, income effects dominate substitution effects. Hence, global savings
(θt + kt+1) are a decreasing function of their return.
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on money. An effective rise in inflation takes place. The initial expectations are
self-fulfilling.
Now, we will be interested in the stabilizing role of different economic poli-
cies. A policy is stabilizing in our framework as soon as it reduces the range of
parameters for expectation-driven fluctuations. In the following, we will focus on
empirically plausible fluctuations, namely fluctuations occurring when savings
are increasing in their global return. Since savings are an increasing function of
the portfolio global return when εv < 1, it appears relevant to focus on the sta-
bilizing role of fiscal and monetary policies under gross substitutability. Hence,
we will focus on the most interesting case, i.e. Proposition 4.1.
Assumption 7
εu < ε
s
u and εv < 1.
We now investigate the second aim of this paper. We analyze the stabilizing
role of fiscal and monetary policies, and compare them.
6 The stabilizing role of fiscal vs. monetary po-
licy
In this section, we study the stabilizing role of fiscal and monetary policies on
expectation-driven fluctuations with a bubble. As expectation-driven fluctua-
tions are mainly driven by portfolio choices between capital, money and bonds,
we consider policy tools that are able to modify the return on assets. We first
examine the role of progressive taxation of capital income on bubble fluctuations.
Second, we consider the monetary policy with an interest rate rule responding
to inflation, then a direct management of the interest rate regardless the infla-
tion. We will show that a progressive taxation of capital income and a direct
management of the interest rate are most powerful to stabilize than a Taylor
rule.
6.1 The stabilizing role of fiscal policy (φ = 0)
To keep things as simple as possible, we consider a fixed interest rate it+1 = i
∗,
and restrict our analysis to the cases where the marginal tax rate is not too high
and/or an elasticity of capital-labor substitution not too small:
Assumption 8
σ ≥ 1− α
g′(f ′(1))
≡ σˆ
For the dynamic analysis, we focus on geometrical arguments. We show
that under Assumptions 1− 8, we obtain the same configuration as Proposition
4.1 and the same figure as in Section 5.2. The location of the Σ-line is given in
Appendix C.2. When εu < ε
s
u, the Σ-line starts inside the triangle ABC, crosses
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(AC) below C, then (AB) between A and B, and ends inside the triangle ABC
at (T (+∞),D (+∞)) on the horizontal axis. Under Assumptions 1 − 8, local
indeterminacy occurs if εv < ε
s
v.
We recall that our aim is to determine whether a fiscal policy can stabi-
lize expectation-driven fluctuations around the bubbly steady state under gross
substitutability. To do this, we examine how the critical bifurcation value εsv
varies as a function of ρ2 to get a picture of the role of progressivity of capi-
tal income taxation on local indeterminacy. See also Figure 2 for a qualitative
illustration.
Figure 2: Stabilizing role of fiscal policy
Proposition 5 Under Assumptions 1-8, we have ∂εsv/∂ρ2 < 0. Therefore, in-
creasing the marginal progressivity of capital income taxation reduces the range
of parameters for local indeterminacy around k∗ = 1, and the range of parame-
ters for the multiplicity of steady states, i.e. global indeterminacy.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Proposition 5 indicates that increasing the degree of marginal progressivity
may rule out expectation-driven fluctuations under gross substitutability.
In the literature and in particular in the Ramsey models with a represen-
tative agent, the most prominent mechanism for the occurrence of endogenous
fluctuations in the neighborhood of a steady state relies on the existence of
the so-called wrong slopes on the labor market. In such models, the stabili-
zing tool is per se labor income taxation, and progressivity may rule out these
wrong slopes. This stabilizing virtue of progressivity in labor income taxation
has been underlined by Guo and Lansing (1998). In a Ramsey model with
heterogeneous agents (see Bosi and Seegmuller (2010b)), a larger progressivity
in capital income taxation promotes endogenous fluctuations because it makes
the after-tax interest rate increasing in capital. In our paper, the mechanism
is quite different, and relies on the portfolio choice between the different assets.
A progressive capital income tax reduces the gaps between the returns on dif-
ferent assets along the dynamic path. More precisely, increasing the degree of
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progressivity of capital income taxation counteracts the collateral effect, and
thus mitigates the failure of the Fisher equation (see Eq. (12)).
Note also that even though capital income taxation is a distorting instru-
ment, it goes in an opposite direction than the collateral effect at the steady
state. Indeed, it reduces or even rules out the over-accumulation of capital at
all steady states.22
We have shown that a fiscal policy is therefore powerful to locally and glo-
bally stabilize. We can wonder now whether a monetary policy can have similar
stabilizing virtues.
6.2 The stabilizing role of monetary policy (g(Rk) = Rk)
We examine the stabilizing virtues of different monetary rules on bubble fluctu-
ations. To highlight the role of monetary policy, we consider the model without
taxation on capital income (g(Rk) = Rk). First, we investigate the stabilizing
virtues of a Taylor rule (φ > 0). Second, we wonder whether a direct manage-
ment of the nominal interest rate independently of inflation could be relevant to
prevent from expectation-driven fluctuations with a speculative bubble (φ = 0).
Under gross substitutability such a monetary policy is powerful to prevent our
economy with a speculative bubble from macroeconomic fluctuations.
6.2.1 The stabilizing role of monetary policy under a Taylor rule
(φ > 0)
In this section, we examine how local dynamics are modified by the implemen-
tation of an interest rate rule given by Eq. (23). To facilitate as possible this
study, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 9 f ′(1) > 11+i∗γ
Assumption 9 ensures that money is a dominated asset, i.e. has a lower return
than capital.
Enriching the model with an interest rate rule generates new configurations
as regards the range of parameter values for which local indeterminacy around
the normalized steady state occurs.
We conduct the analysis considering the variable aφ = φ/(1− φ) instead of
φ. We note that aφ < −1 corresponds to an active rule (φ > 1), and aφ > 0
corresponds to a passive rule (φ < 1). As shown in Appendix E.1, for aφ ∈
]−∞,−1]∪]0, a˜φ], local indeterminacy occurs when εv > max(εfv , εsv) and when
εv < min(ε
h
v , ε
s
v). For aφ ∈ (a˜φ, a¯φ), local indeterminacy occurs when εv < εsv.
For aφ ∈ (a¯φ,+∞), local indeterminacy occurs when εv > εsv (see Figure 3).23
Now, we are interested in the variations of these critical values with respect to
aφ in order to analyze the stabilizing role of a monetary policy under a Taylor
rule. See also Figure 3 for a qualitative illustration.
22In our framework, an analysis of the welfare at the steady state appears however difficult
to conduct.
23The expressions of a˜φ and a¯φ are given in Appendix E.1.
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Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 1− 9, the impact of the monetary policy on the
bifurcation values are given by the following derivatives24:
∂εfv
∂aφ
> 0,
∂εhv
∂aφ
> 0 and
∂εsv
∂aφ
= 0.
Proof. See Appendix E.1.
Appendix E.1 also allows us to construct Figure 3 that summarizes the
stability properties of the economy. Grey areas correspond to indeterminacy
regions. The next proposition summarizes the stabilizing role of this interest
rate rule:
Figure 3: Stabilizing role of monetary policy under a Taylor rule
Proposition 6 Under Assumptions 1− 9, the following generically holds25:
1. If aφ ∈]−∞, aˆφ] or if aφ ∈ [a¯φ,+∞[, local indeterminacy is ruled out for
εv < ε
s
v, but occurs whatever εv > ε
s
v.
2. If aφ ∈ (aˆφ,−1), increasing the degree of responsiveness of the rule with
respect to the expected inflation (φ) reduces the range of parameters for
local indeterminacy when εv is large enough, but raises the range of pa-
rameters for local indeterminacy when εv is small enough.
24The functions εfv and ε
h
v are homographics. ε
f
v has a vertical asymptote for aφ = a˜φ, and
εhv has one for aφ = a¯φ.
25aˆφ is given by ε
f
v = ε
s
v .
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3. If aφ ∈ (0, a¯φ), increasing the degree of responsiveness of the rule with
respect to the expected inflation (φ) reduces the range of parameters for
local indeterminacy when εv is large enough, but has no impact on the
range of parameters for local indeterminacy when εv is small enough.
Proposition 6 highlights mitigated results. In contrast to Sorger (2005) and
Clain-Chamosset-Yvrard and Seegmuller (2012) where the monetary policy is
however determined by the money growth factor, no clear-cut conclusion is
outlined. Indeed, a weakly active or passive rule (i.e. aφ ∈]−∞, aˆφ[∪]a¯φ,+∞])
tends to destabilize promoting indeterminacy for εsv < εv < 1. Recalling that
the multiplicity of steady states occurs for εv < ε
s
v, Lemma 2 allows us to show:
Proposition 7 Under Assumptions 1−9, conducting an interest rate rule given
by Eq. (23) neither promotes nor rules out the multiplicity of steady states. The
range of parameters for the multiplicity of steady states is not altered by such a
policy.
Our conclusion confirms the result of Clain-Chamosset-Yvrard and Seeg-
muller (2012): a monetary policy rule which responds only to expected inflation
has no impact on the multiplicity of steady states.
A Taylor interest rate rule has no clear stabilizing virtues. One possible
explanation is that it manages the level of the elasticity of the nominal interest
rate with respect to the expected inflation (φ) and not directly the interest rate
target (i∗). For instance, a weakly active or passive rule tends to destabilize
for εv > ε
s
v, because such a rule has not a huge impact on the nominal interest
rate, and therefore does not modify so much the portfolio choices. For that
reason, we consider now an alternative monetary policy which directly manages
the nominal interest rate independently on the inflation, as an interest rate
pegging.
6.2.2 The stabilizing role of direct management of the interest rate
(φ = 0)
By such a monetary policy, we mean that the central bank fixes the nominal
interest rate at a constant rate i∗. We analyze how the local stability proper-
ties of the model are modified following a change in the level of the interest
rate target. We will see that decreasing the level of the target may rule out
expectation-driven fluctuations with a positive rational bubble.
Under Assumption 7, we stay in Proposition 4.1.26 Local indeterminacy
arises for εv < ε
s
v. Therefore, we examine now how the bifurcation value ε
s
v
varies with respect to i∗. See also Figure 4 for a qualitative illustration.
Proposition 8 Under Assumptions 1-7, we have ∂εsv/∂i
∗ > 0. Therefore, a
higher nominal interest rate target i∗ increases the range of parameters for local
indeterminacy around k∗ = 1, and the range of parameters for the multiplicity
of steady states, i.e. global indeterminacy.
26Proof of Proposition 4 given in Appendix C.2 is satisfied whatever the level of the nominal
interest rate i∗ satisfying Assumptions 1− 6.
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Figure 4: Stabilizing role of direct management of the interest rate
Proof. See Appendix E.2.
Proposition 8 shows that when εv < 1, a lower nominal interest rate i
∗
reduces the range of εv that guarantees indeterminacy. Under gross substitu-
tability, lowering the level of the nominal interest rate contributes to globally
and locally stabilize our economy by ruling out endogenous fluctuations and the
multiplicity of steady states.
This result can be related to some previous contributions. Indeed, in a
model without collateral effect, Rochon and Polemarchakis (2006) show that
a weak interest rate can prevent the economy from endogenous fluctuations.
However, the underlying mechanism is different since indeterminacy can only
occur under a negative bubble in their framework. The monetary policy has
also been investigated when the monetary authority directly manages the money
growth factor. In an exchange economy, Bosi and Seegmuller (2013) show that
an expansionary policy may rule out expectation-driven fluctuations that may
occur however only for large income effects. In contrast, Bosi and Seegmuller
(2010a) get the opposite result in an economy with capital accumulation, but
without inside money.
In our framework, the monetary policy based on a direct management of
the interest rate independently on expected inflation appears to be the most
powerful to stabilize endogenous business cycles, and to prevent from global
indeterminacy associated to the multiplicity of steady states.
However, a stabilizing policy may deteriorate the welfare at the steady state.
In order to examine the trade-off between benefits and costs of the monetary
policy, we evaluate the welfare at the stationary equilibrium.
Effect of monetary policy on the stationary welfare. The presence
of credit constraints affected by collateral does not only play a crucial role on
the existence of expectation-driven fluctuations, but allows the financial sphere
to affect the real one. As a consequence, the dichotomy between monetary and
real spheres is no longer relevant. Because of the role of collateral, the Fisher
relationship is no more satisfied: the level of the nominal interest rate has real
effects on the steady state. The superneutrality of money is canceled, and the
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monetary policy alters the welfare at the steady state.27
Proposition 9 Under Assumptions 1− 7, the effect of the interest rate target
on the welfare is the following:
1. If εv < ε
s
v(k), the welfare is an increasing function of the interest rate
target i∗.
2. If εv > ε
s
v(k), the welfare is a decreasing function of the interest rate target
i∗.
Proof. See Appendix E.3.
Proposition 9 indicates that for a sufficiently small degree of utility concavity
εv, a decrease in the interest rate target deteriorates the welfare at the steady
state. For an arbitrarily large degree of utility concavity, we reverse this result.
When collateral does not matter (η1(k) = 0), the welfare properties of the model
correspond to the second case of Proposition 9. Thus, the Friedman rule, for
which setting the nominal interest rate target at zero is welfare maximizing, is
satisfied. By fixing the level of the nominal interest rate at zero, the monetary
authority eliminates the distortion associated to money holdings, which involves
the highest level of welfare.
When collateral matters (η1(k) > 0), the Friedman rule does not hold for a
small degree of concavity εv. One possible explanation relies on the portfolio
choice. An increase in the nominal interest rate target generates a reallocation
of savings towards capital. We recall that capital income is increasing in capital
since we assume large input substitution. As a result, the welfare improves
because households get a higher capital income and spend less through money
holdings (collateral effect).
We deduce that under gross substitutability, a stabilizing goal of the mo-
netary authority can damage the welfare as long as εv < ε
s
v. Nevertheless,
decreasing the interest rate target improves the welfare as soon as there is no
more room for fluctuations.
Therefore, the stabilizing role of the monetary policy has to be considered
with caution since the welfare gain of stabilizing is usually small regarding the
effect of the monetary policy on the steady state.
7 Concluding remarks
We develop an overlapping generations model with capital accumulation, bonds
and money, where the share of consumption purchased on credit depends on
the collateral. This allows us to show the existence of expectation-driven fluc-
tuations with a positive rational bubble on bonds. This occurs when the credit
share is weakly increasing, but sufficiently concave in the collateral. In addition,
27When the Fisher relationship is not satisfied, we can highlight Tobin/anti-Tobin effects.
Depending on values on fundamentals, the nominal interest rate enhances or dampens the
capital accumulation at the steady state.
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endogenous fluctuations are in accordance with gross substitutability and a not
too weak substitution between inputs. The basic mechanism for fluctuations
relies on a portfolio trade-off between the three assets due to the violation of
the Fisher relationship.
This framework is also used to compare the stabilizing role of some fiscal and
monetary policies. We show that a progressive taxation of capital income may
rule out expectation-driven fluctuations, the multiplicity of steady states, and
even over-accumulation of capital. When the monetary policy is fixed according
to a Taylor rule on expected inflation, the results are more mitigated. One
reason is that such a rule does not alter so much the portfolio choices. However,
when we focus on a direct management of the level of the nominal interest
rate, i.e. when the nominal interest rate is set independently of inflation, a
sufficiently low interest rate may rule out expectation-driven fluctuations and
the multiplicity of steady states. However, such a policy may be detrimental
for welfare. To summarize, in contrast to a Taylor rule, a progressive taxation
of capital income and a direct management of the interest rate are powerful to
stabilize the economy which experiences a positive bubble.
8 Appendix
Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1
We maximize the Lagrangian function:
L = u (ct) + βv (dt+1)
+λ1t (wt − pit+1mt+1 − pit+1bt+1 − kt+1 − ct)
+λ2t (mt+1 + (1 + it+1) bt+1 + g(Rt+1kt+1) + δt+1 − dt+1)
+λ3t (mt+1 − γ (kt+1) dt+1) (41)
with respect to (ct, dt+1,mt+1, bt+1, qt, λ1t, λ2t, λ3t).
∂L()
∂c
= u′(ct)− λ1t = 0 (42)
∂L()
∂d
= βv′(dt+1)− λ2t − γ(kt+1)λ3t = 0 (43)
∂L()
∂m
= −pit+1λ1t + λ2t + λ3t = 0 (44)
∂L()
∂b
= −pit+1λ1t + (1 + it+1)λ2t = 0 (45)
∂L()
∂k
= −λ1t +Rt+1g′(Rt+1kt+1)λ2t − λ3tγ′(kt+1)dt+1 = 0 (46)
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Since λ1t = u
′ (ct) > 0, it+1 > −1 and from Eq. (45) λ2t = λ1t pit+11+it+1 > 0,
then the constraints (8)-(9) become binding. From Eq. (44), we obtain:
λ3t = λ1t
it+1pit+1
1 + it+1
(47)
The strict positivity of λ3t requires it+1 > 0.
From Eqs. (42)-(43) and the expressions of λ2t and λ3t, we get Eq. (11). In
addition, substituting the expressions of λ2t and λ3t into Eq. (46), we obtain
Eq. (12).
Now, we can compute the Hessian matrix of the Lagrangian function (41)
with respect to (λ1t, λ2t, λ3t, ct, dt+1,mt+1, bt+1, kt+1)
28:
H88 ≡

0 0 0 −1 0 −pi −pi −1
0 0 0 0 −1 1 1 + i Rg′(Rk)
0 0 0 0 −γ 1 0 −γ′d
−1 0 0 u′′ 0 0 0 0
0 −1 −γ 0 βv′′ 0 0 −γ′λ3
−pi 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
−pi 1 + i 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 Rg′(Rk) −γ′d 0 −γ′λ3 0 0 R2g′′(Rk)λ2 − λ3γ′′d

(48)
In order to get a strict local maximum, we need to check the negative defi-
nition of H88 over the set of points satisfying the constraints. Let p and n the
numbers of constraints and variables. If the determinant of H88 has sign (−1)n
and the last n − p diagonal principal minors have alternating signs, then the
optimum is a regular local maximum. In our case n = 5 and p = 3. Therefore,
we need to compute the last two diagonal principal minors, that is detH88 and
detH77.
29 Moreover, we require detH88 < 0 and detH77 > 0.
detH88 = −u′′pi2 (1 + iγ)2 [R2g′′λ2 − dγ′′λ3]− βv′′(1 + i)2[R2g′′λ2 − dγ′′λ3]
+(1 + i)2(λ3γ
′)2
= (piλ1)
2 iγ
′
k
{
εu
c
(1 + iγ)2pi
1 + i
[
ρ2ρ1g
iη1(1− γ) + η2d
]
+
εv
d
(1 + iγ)
[
ρ2ρ1g
iη1(1− γ) + η2d
]
− iη1(1− γ)
}
(49)
As γ′ < 0, detH88 < 0 if and only if:
εu
c
(1 + iγ)2pi
1 + i
[
ρ2ρ1g
iη1(1− γ) + η2d
]
+
εv
d
(1 + iγ)
[
ρ2ρ1g
iη1(1− γ) + η2d
]
−iη1(1− γ) > 0 (50)
28For simplicity, the arguments of the functions and the time subscripts are omitted.
29H88 is the Hessian matrix, while H77 is the Hessian matrix minus the last column and
the last line.
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While
detH77 = −u′′pi2 (1 + iγ)2 − (1 + i)2βv′′ > 0 (51)
For η2 > 0,
εu
c
(1 + iγ)2pi
1 + i
[
ρ2ρ1g
iη1(1− γ) + η2d
]
− iη1(1 − γ) > 0 is a sufficient
condition for detH88 < 0. Thus, for η2 > 0, the second-order conditions are
satisfied if30:
εu > c
(1 + i)
pi
iη1 (1− γ)[
ρ2ρ1g
iη1(1− γ) + η2d
]
(1 + iγ)
2
≡ ε˜u (52)
whatever the value of εv ≥ 0.
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1
A steady state k is a solution of h (k) = j (k), with:
h (k) ≡ u
′ (c(k))
βv′ (d(k))
(53a) j (k) ≡ 1
1 + i∗γ(k)
(53b)
where c (k) ≡ f(k)−k− k[1− ψ(k)]
i∗η1(k)[1− γ(k)] − [kf
′(k)− g(f ′(k)k)] and d (k) ≡
k[1− ψ(k)]
i∗η1(k)[1− γ(k)] , with ψ(k) ≡ f
′(k)g′(f ′(k)).
We start by determining the admissible range of values for k. To ensure d(k) > 0,
we get at the steady state ψ (k) < 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 4, ψ(k) is a
decreasing function of k. Hence, k > ψ−1 (1) = k.
Now, we want to determine the range of k such that c(k) > 0. The decreasing
returns on capital imply:
f (k) > kf ′(k)
Since ψ(k) = 1, one has f ′(k) =
1
g′(f ′(k)k)
. Under Assumption 1, g(yk) is
concave, i.e. g(f ′(k)k) > g′(f ′(k)k)f ′(k)k. This involves that:
g (f ′(k)k) > k
Hence, we deduce that:
c(k) = f(k)− kf ′(k) + g(f ′(k)k)− k > 0
30For simplicity, the arguments of the functions and the time subscripts are omitted.
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In addition, as d(k) > 0 and τ(f ′(k)k) = kf ′(k) − g(f ′(k)k) > 0, we derive
the following inequality:
lim
k→+∞
c (k) < lim
k→+∞
f(k)− k = −∞
because f ′(k) < 1 for k large enough. As a result, there exists one value k such
that ∀k < k, c (k) > 0. By construction, we have k < k, and therefore (k, k) is
a nonempty subset.
To prove the existence of a stationary solution k, we use the continuity of
h (k) and j (k). Using Eqs. (53a) and (53b), we determine the boundary values
of h (k) and j (k):
limk→k h (k) =
u′ (c (k))
βv′(0)
= 0+ limk→k h (k) =
u′ (c (0))
βv′(d(k)
+∞
limk→k j (k) =
1
1 + i(k)γ(k)
∈]0, 1] limk→k j (k) =
1
1 + i(k)γ
(
k
) ≤ 1
We have limk→k h (k) < limk→k j (k) and limk→k h (k) > limk→k j (k). There-
fore, there exists at least one value k∗ ∈ (k, k) such that h (k∗) = j (k∗).
Proof of Proposition 3
Let
εdk ≡ d
′(1)
d(1)
=
ψ
1− ψ
[
1− α
σ
+ ρ2
(
1− 1− α
σ
)]
+ η2, (54)
ν(η1) = i
∗η1 (1− γ) , and (55)
c∗ = f(1)− 1− 1− ψ
ν(η1)
− [f ′(1)− g((f ′(1))] (56)
To deal with the multiplicity of stationary solutions, we derive the following
elasticities at the normalized steady state k∗ = 1:
h ≡ h
′(1)
h(1)
= εvεdk +
εu
c∗
{
1− f ′(1) + 1− ψ
ν(η1)
εdk
+f ′(1)
(
1− 1− α
σ
)
[1− g′(f ′(1))]
}
j ≡ j
′(1)
j(1)
=
ν(η1)
1 + i∗γ
(57)
We can now derive the conditions for the multiplicity of steady states. Let
Ω ≡ 1− f ′(1) + 1− ψ
ν(η1)
εdk + f
′(1)
(
1− 1− α
σ
)
[1− g′(f ′(1))] (58)
εsu ≡ c∗Ω−1
ν(η1)
1 + i∗γ
(59)
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A sufficient condition for the multiplicity of steady states is εh < εj for k
∗ = 1.
This is equivalent to the inequality written in Proposition 3, that is31:
εv <
Ω
εdk
(
εsu
c∗
− εu
c∗
)
≡ εsv (60)
Using the notations of the proof of Proposition 1, we know that h
(
k¯
)
> j
(
k¯
)
and h (k) < j (k). Since k∗ = 1 is a steady state, we have: h (1) = j (1). If
the inequality written in Proposition 3 is satisfied, we have εh (1) < εj (1),
then by continuity at least two other steady states exist, k1 and k2 such that
k1 < 1 < k2. The number of steady states is generically odd.
Appendix C
C.1 Proofs for Section 5.1
Linearized dynamic system
We linearize the system (32) around a steady state k∗ = 1 with respect to
(kt, θt, kt+1, θt+1). Let ν(η1) ≡ i∗η1 (1− γ) > 0 and aφ = φ1−φ , we obtain32:
[
εv
ν(η1)ψ
1− ψ
(
1− 1− α
σ
)
+
εu
c∗
− ν(η1)
1 + i∗γ
]
dkt+1
k
+
[
εv
1− ψ − gν(η1)
1− ψ − 1− aφ
γ (1 + i∗)
1 + i∗γ
]
dθt+1
θ
=
εu
c∗
f ′(1)
1− α
σ
dkt
k
−
[
1 +
εu
c∗
1− ψ − gi∗η1(1− γ)
ν(η1)
+ aφ
γ (1 + i∗)
1 + i∗γ
]
dθt
θ
− (1− ψ)
{
ψ
1− ψ
[
1− α
σ
+ ρ2
(
1− 1− α
σ
)]
+ η2 − ν(η1)ψ
1− ψ
(
1− 1− α
σ
)}
dkt+1
k
−
[
ψ + gν(η1) + aφ (1− ψ) 1 + i
∗
i∗
]
dθt+1
θ
= −
[
1 + (1− ψ) aφ 1 + i
∗
i∗
]
dθt
θ
From these above dynamic equations, we derive the characteristic polynomial.
Let
χ1 = χ
a
1aφ + χ
b
1, with (61)
χa1 ≡ −ψν(η1)
(
1− 1− α
σ
)
1 + i∗
i∗
, (62)
χb1 ≡ [1− ψ − gν(η1)] εdk −
ψ
1− ψν(η1)
(
1− 1− α
σ
)
, (63)
31Under Assumptions 1-4, one has: εdk > 0, Ω > 0 and ε
s
u > 0.
32For simplicity, the arguments of the functions are omitted
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χ2 = χ
a
2aφ + χ
b
2, with (64)
χa2 ≡ − (1− ψ)
1 + i∗
i∗
, (65)
χb2 ≡ − [ψ + gν(η1)] , (66)
χ3 = χ
a
3aφ + χ
b
3 , with (67)
χa3 ≡
(1− ψ) (1 + i∗)
i∗(1 + i∗γ)
{
ν(η1)
[
1 +
i∗γψ
1− ψ
(
1− 1− α
σ
)]
− εdki∗γ
}
, (68)
χb3 ≡ ν(η1)2
g
1 + i∗γ
+ ν(η1)ψ
(
1− 1− α
σ
+
1
1 + i∗γ
)
− (1− ψ) εdk, (69)
with εdk given by Eq. (54) in Appendix B.
Lemma 3 Let
ε¯v ≡ −χ−11
(εu
c∗
χ2 + χ3
)
. (70)
Under Assumptions 1-6 and εv 6= ε¯v, the characteristic polynomial, evaluated
at the steady state k∗ = 1, writes P (X) ≡ X2 − T (εv)X +D (εv) = 0:
D(εv) = −εu/c∗f ′(1)1− α
σ
1 + (1− ψ) aφ(1 + i∗)/i∗
χ1 (εv − ε¯v) (71)
T (εv) = 1 +D(εv)− [1− ψ − gν(η1)] εdk εv − ε
s
v
χ1 (εv − ε¯v) , (72)
where εdk and ε
s
v are given by Eqs. (54) and (60) in Appendix B.
Characteristics of the Σ-line
The Σ-line is characterized by a starting point and a endpoint given by:
D(0) = εu/c
∗f ′(1)
1− α
σ
1 + (1− ψ) aφ(1 + i∗)/i∗
χ1ε¯v
T (0) = 1 +D(0)− [1− ψ − gν(η1)] εdk ε
s
v
χ1ε¯v
D(+∞) = 0
T (+∞) = −ψν(η1)
(
1− 1−ασ
)
[1/(1− ψ) + aφ (1 + i∗) /i∗]
χ1
We further note that the Σ-line has a slope S given by:
S =
D′(εv)
T ′(εv)
=
Z1
Z1 + Z2
, where (73)
Z1 = (εu/c
∗)f ′(1)
1− α
σ
[
1 + (1− ψ) aφ 1 + i
∗
i∗
]
(74)
Z2 = [1− ψ − gν(η1)] εdk (ε¯v − εsv) (75)
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Bifurcation values
εhv is defined by D(εv) = 1:
εhv =
Υ
χ1
(εu
c∗
− χ3
Υ
)
, where (76)
Υ = Υaaφ + Υ
b, with (77)
Υa ≡ −χa2 − f ′(1) (1− ψ)
1− α
σ
1 + i∗
i∗
, and (78)
Υb ≡ −χb2 − f ′(1)
1− α
σ
(79)
with χ1, χ
a
2 , χ
b
2 and χ3 given by Eqs. (61), (65), (66) and (67) in Appendix C.1.
εsv is defined by 1− T (εv) +D(εv) = 0:
εsv =
Ω
εdk
(
εsu
c∗
− εu
c∗
)
, (80)
where Ω and εsu are respectively given by Eqs. (58) and (59) in Appendix B.
εfv is defined by 1 + T (εv) +D(εv) = 0:
εfv =
ζ2
ζ1
(
εu
c∗
− ζ3
ζ2
)
, where (81)
ζ1 = ζ
a
1 aφ + ζ
b
1, with (82)
ζa1 ≡ 2χa1 , and (83)
ζb1 ≡ χb1 −
ψ
1− ψν(η1)
(
1− 1− α
σ
)
(84)
ζ2 = ζ
a
2 aφ + ζ
b
2 with (85)
ζa2 ≡ 2(1− ψ)
1 + i∗
i∗
[
1 + f ′(1)
1− α
σ
]
, and (86)
ζb2 ≡ 2
[
ψ + gν(η1) + f
′(1)
1− α
σ
]
+ Ω [1− ψ − gν(η1)] (87)
ζ3 = ζ
a
3 aφ + ζ
b
3, with (88)
ζa3 ≡ 2χa3 , and (89)
ζb3 ≡ χb3 + ν(η1)
[
ψ
(
1− 1− α
σ
)
+
1
1 + i∗γ
]
− (1− ψ) εdk (90)
with χa1 , χ
b
1, χ
a
3 and χ
b
3 respectively given by Eqs. (62), (63), (68) and (69) in
Appendix C.1 and εdk given by Eq. (54) in Appendix B.
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C.2 Proofs for Proposition 4
Location of the Σ-line when φ = 0 (aφ = 0)
In this section, we locate the Σ-line in the (T,D) plane, using (T (0), D(0)),
(T (+∞), D(+∞)) and the value of its slope S when φ = 0 (aφ = 0). We recall
that we consider η1 not too large (Assumption 6), since we are interested in the
equilibria with a positive bubble (θ > 0).
Before analyzing the location of the Σ-line, we need to determine the sign
of χ1, χ2 and χ3 when aφ = 0. More precisely, we will show that for η1 suffi-
ciently small, χ1 > 0, χ2 < 0 and χ3 < 0. First, under Assumptions 1-5 and
because ψ < 1 at the steady state, we have εdk > 0, Ω > 0, and ε
s
u > 0.
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There is a threshold ηχ11 ∈ R+ such that ∀η1 < ηχ11 , χ1 > 0 under Assumptions
1-5. Furthermore, χ2 < 0 ∀η1 ∈ R+ under Assumptions 1-5. Finally, there is
a threshold ηχ31 ∈ R+ such that ∀η1 < ηχ31 , χ3 < 0 under Assumptions 1-5.
Thus, under Assumptions 1-6, one has: χ1 > 0, χ2 < 0 and χ3 < 0, and there-
fore, ε¯v = −χ−11
(
εu
c∗ χ2 + χ3
)
> 0. For the rest of the proof, we consider ψ < 1,
1−ψ−gν(η1) > 0, εdk > 0, Ω > 0, εsu > 0, χ1 > 0, χ2 < 0, χ3 < 0 and ε¯v > 0.34
The starting point and the endpoint of the Σ-line are such that:
D(0) = εu/c
∗f ′(1)
1− α
σ
1
χ1ε¯v
> 0 (91)
1− T (0) +D(0) = 1− ψ − gν(η1)
ε¯v
εdk
(
εsu
c∗
− εu
c∗
)
(92)
D(+∞) = and T (+∞) = − ψ
1− ψ
ν(η1)
χ1
(
1− 1− α
σ
)
, (93)
where εsu and ε¯v are respectively given by Eqs. (59) and (70).
First of all, let us see whether D(0) < 1. D(0) < 1 is equivalent to the
following condition:
χ3 <
εu
c∗
{
f ′(1)
[
g′(f ′(1))− 1− α
σ
]
+ gν(η1)
}
This above condition is satisfied under Assumptions 1-6 and 8. Hence, the
starting point (T (0), D(0)) locates below the segment [BC].
The sign of 1 − T (0) + D(0) informs us on which side of (AC) the starting
point (T (0), D(0)) is located. When εu < ε
s
u, one has 1 − T (0) + D(0) >
0. Nevertheless, the second-order conditions require that εsu > ε˜u which is
equivalent to:
η2(1− ψ)i∗γ > i∗η1 (1− γ)
{
1− f ′(1) +
(
1− 1− α
σ
)
[f ′(1)− ψ]
}
+ ψ
1− α
σ
−ψρ2
(
1− α
σ
+ i∗γ
)
33The expressions of εdk > 0, Ω > 0, and ε
s
u > 0 are respectively given by Eqs. (54), (58)
and (59) in Appendix B.
34From this proof, we deduce that χb1 > 0, χ
b
2 < 0 and χ
b
3 > 0.
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Hence, for a small degree of concavity on u(c) and under Assumptions 1-6, the
starting point locates on the left-side of (AC). In addition, when εu > ε
s
u, we
get 1 − T (0) + D(0) < 0. The starting point locates on the right-side of (AC)
when εu > ε
s
u.
The endpoint (T (+∞), D(+∞)) locates on the horizontal axis. Furthermore,
one has T (+∞) < 0 under Assumptions 1-6 (see Eq. (93)). Let us see now on
which side of (AB) is (T (+∞), D(+∞)), that is if T (+∞) is lower or greater
than −1. T (+∞) > −1 involves the following condition:
[1− ψ − gν(η1)] 1− ψ
ν(η1)
εdk − 2ψ
(
1− 1− α
σ
)
> 0
Under Assumptions 1-5, this inequality is satisfied for a sufficiently small η1.
Thus, the endpoint is on the right-side of (AB) under Assumptions 1-6.
Now, we study the slope S of the Σ-line and how T (εv) and D(εv) vary with
respect to εv. When φ = 0, the slope S of the Σ-line is given by:
S =
D′(εv)
T ′(εv)
=
Z1
Z1 + Z2
(94)
where
Z1 = (εu/c
∗)f ′(1)
1− α
σ
> 0 and
Z2 = Z
a
2 + Z
b
2, with
Za2 =
[1− ψ − gν(η1)] εdk
χ1
εu
c∗
(
χ1
Ω
εdk
− χ2
)
, and
Zb2 = −
[1− ψ − gν(η1)] εdk
χ1
[
i∗η1(1− γ)
1 + i∗γ
χ1
εdk
+ χ3
]
,
where χ1 > 0, χ2 < 0, χ3 < 0 are respectively given by Eqs. (61), (64) and (67)
in Appendix C.1, and εdk > 0, Ω > 0 and c
∗ by Eqs. (54), (58) and (56) in
Appendix B.
Under Assumptions 1-6, we have Za2 ≥ 0. Zb2 can be rewritten as follows:
Zb2 = −
[1− ψ − gν(η1)] εdk
χ1
P (ν(η1)),
where P (ν(η1)) is a quadratic polynomial defined on R+ such that:
P (ν(η1)) = − ν(η1)
2
1 + i∗γ
ε−1dk
ψ
1− ψ
(
1− 1− α
σ
)
+ ν(η1)
[
ψ
(
1− 1− α
σ
)
+
1
1 + i∗γ
]
− (1− ψ) εdk
Under Assumptions 1-4, P (ν(η1)) is a concave function with P (ν(0)) < 0
and reaches its maximum for η1 = η1max > 0. As a consequence, there is a
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threshold ηˆ1 ∈ R+ such that ∀η1 < ηˆ1, P (ν(η1)) is negative (P (ν(η1) < 0). This
implies that Zb2 > 0 under Assumptions 1-6, and therefore, Z2 > 0.
As Z1 > 0 and Z2 > 0, wa can conclude that the slope S of the Σ-line belongs
to (0, 1) under Assumptions 1-6. Moreover, as D′(εv) = Z1/
[
χ1(εv − ε¯v)2
]
and
T ′(εv) = D′(εv) + Z2/
[
χ1(εv − ε¯v)2
]
, we also have T ′(εv) ≥ 0 and D′(εv) ≥ 0.
To further analyze the slope S, we show now that the Σ-line goes below C.
We need to prove that under Assumptions 1-6 (i.e η1 not too large), we have
εsv < ε
h
v . This is equivalent to the following inequality:
0 > κ1 + κ2, with
κ1 = −εu
c∗
{
Ω
εdk
+
gν(η1) + f
′(1)
[
g′(f ′(1))− 1−ασ
]
χ1
}
, and
κ2 =
ν(η1)
1 + i∗γ
ε−1dk +
χ3
χ1
We can deduce that under Assumptions 1-6 and 8, κ1 ≤ 0. As regards κ2,
we can rewrite it as follows:
κ2 =
P (ν(η1))
χ1
From the previous analysis about the value of the slope S, we know that
P (ν(η1)) < 0 under Assumptions 1-6. Therefore, κ2 < 0 under these assump-
tions. As κ1 < 0 and κ2 < 0, we can conclude that under Assumptions 1-6
εsv < ε
h
v . As a consequence, the Σ-line goes below C.
Note that the proof also holds true when no fiscal policies are implemented
(i.e. g(Rk) = Rk), and in particular for ρ1 = 1 and ρ2 = 0.
As regards the size of εsv, we can show that when no progressive fiscal policies
are implemented (i.e. ρ1 = 1 and ρ2 = 0), ε
s
v < 1. Indeed, the condition ε
s
u > ε˜u
rewrites:
ν(η1) < η2i
∗γ − f
′(1)
1− f ′(1)
1− α
σ
Hence, we have ν(η1)/(1 + i
∗γ)ε−1dk < 1.
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Since εsv = ν(η1)/(1 + i
∗γ)ε−1dk −
εu
c∗
1− f ′(1)
ν(η1)
[ν(η1) + εdk], we can conclude
that εsv < 1.
Furthermore, one has εhv > 1 for a sufficiently large η2. Therefore, under
Assumptions 1-6, we get: εsv < 1 and ε
f
v > 1.
35When ρ1 = 1 and ρ2 = 0, εdk =
f ′(1)
1−f ′(1)
1−α
σ
+ η2 > 0.
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Appendix D
Proof of Proposition 5
We determine how the bifurcation value εsv varies with respect to ρ2 when
aφ = 0. The derivative of ε
s
v with respect to ρ2 is given by:
∂εsv
∂ρ2
=
1
ε2dk
[
− ψ
1− ψ
(
1− 1− α
σ
){
ν(η1)
1 + i∗γ
−εu
c∗
[
1− f ′(1) +
(
1− 1− α
σ
)
(f ′(1)− ψ)
]}]
Assumption 7 is equivalent to:
ν(η1)
1 + i∗γ
>
εu
c∗
[
1− f ′(1) + 1− ψ
i∗η1(1− γ)εdk +
(
1− 1− α
σ
)
(f ′(1)− ψ)
]
,
As εdk > 0 under Assumptions 1− 4 ( see Eq. (54) in Appendix B), we deduce
that εsv is a decreasing function of ρ2 (
∂εsv
∂ρ2
< 0). Since indeterminacy occurs for
εv < ε
s
v, this proves Proposition 5.
Appendix E
E.1 Variations of critical values (εfv , ε
h
v , ε
s
v and ε¯v) with
respect to aφ 6= 0 when g(Rk) = Rk
The expressions of 1 − T (εv) + D(εv), 1 + T (εv) + D(εv) and D(εv) can be
written as follows:
1− T (εv) +D(εv) = {1− f ′(1)[1 + ν(η1)]} εdk εv − ε
s
v
χ1 (εv − ε¯v)
1 + T (εv) +D(εv) =
ζ1
(
εv − εfv
)
χ1 (εv − ε¯v)
D(εv)− 1 = ε
h
v − εv
εv − ε¯v ,
with ε¯v, ε
s
v, ε
f
v , ε
h
v , χ1 and ζ1 are respectively given by Eqs. (70), (80), (81),
(76), (61) and (82) in Appendix C.1, and εdk by Eq. (54) in Appendix B.
In this section, we graphically represent the variations of the bifurcation
values (εsv, ε
f
v , ε
h
v ) and the critical value ε¯v in the (aφ, εv) plane, and identify
the areas in which the normalized steady state is a sink.
We can see from Eq. (60) that εsv does not depend on aφ. On the other hand,
the different bifurcation and critical values (εfv , ε
h
v and ε¯v) are homographic
functions of aφ (see Eqs. (70), (81) and (76)) in Appendix C.1 with g
′(f ′(1)) = 1
and ψ = f ′(1)). Since φ > 0, aφ is defined on ]−∞,−1[∪[0,+∞[.
Under Assumptions 1− 6, χa1 < 0, χb1 > 0, χa2 < 0, χb2 < 0, χa3 < 0, χb3 < 0.
ζa1 < 0, ζ
b
1 > 0, ζ
a
2 > 0, ζ
b
2 > 0, ζ
a
3 < 0, ζ
b
3 < 0, Υ
a > 0 and Υb > 0.
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We can note that εfv has a vertical asymptote at aφ = −ζ1/(2χa1) ≡ a˜φ > 0
under Assumptions 1− 6, and that εhv and ε¯v have the same vertical asymptote
at aφ = −χb1/χa1 ≡ a¯φ > −ζ1/(2χa1) under Assumptions 1-6. Note that we
consider only the positive values of εfv , ε
h
v and ε¯v. We can check that:
εfv = 0 ⇔ aε
f
v
φ = −
ζb2εu/c
∗ − ζb3
ζa2 εu/c
∗ − ζa3
(< 0 under Assumptions 1− 6)
εhv = 0 ⇔ aε
h
v
φ = −
Υbεu/c
∗ − χb3
Υaεu/c∗ − χa3
(< 0 under Assumptions 1− 6)
ε¯v = 0 ⇔ aε¯vφ = −
χb2εu/c
∗ + χb3
χa2εu/c
∗ + χa3
(< 0 under Assumption 1− 6)
Under Assumptions 1− 6 and 9, we have aε¯vφ < aε
h
v
φ , and we can clarify that
lim
η2→+∞
a
εfv
φ < limη2→+∞
aε¯vφ .
Furthermore, we can derive the first derivatives with respect to aφ. Under
Assumptions 1− 6, we obtain:
∂εsv
∂aφ
= 0,
∂εfv
∂aφ
=
(
ζa2 ζ
b
1 − ζb2ζa1
)
εu
c∗ −
(
ζa3 ζ
b
1 − ζb3ζa1
)
(ζ˜a1 aφ + ζ˜
b
1)
2
> 0
∂εhv
∂aφ
=
(
Υaχb1 −Υbχa1
)
εu
c∗ −
(
χa3χ
b
1 − χb3χa1
)
(χa1aφ + χ
b
1)
2
> 0
∂ε¯v
∂aφ
= −
(
χa2χ
b
1 − χb2χa1
)
εu
c∗ +
(
χa3χ
b
1 − χb3χa1
)
(χa1aφ + χ
b
1)
2
> 0
We can now draw Figure 3, and deduce the different regions in which the
steady state is a sink, in other words the indeterminacy regions (grey areas in
Figure 3).
E.2 Proof of Proposition 8
We determine the variations of the bifurcation value εsv with respect to i
∗ when
aφ = 0 and g(yk) = yk. As regards the derivative of ε
s
v with respect to i
∗, we
get:
∂εsv
∂i∗
= (εdki
∗)−1
[
ν(η1)
(1 + i∗γ)2
+
εu
c∗2
1− f ′(1)
ν(η1)
(εdkc
∗ + Ω)
]
> 0,
with Ω =
1− f ′(1)
ν(η1)
[ν(η1) + εdk] > 0
Since indeterminacy occurs for εv < ε
s
v, this proves Proposition 8.
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E.3 Proof of Propostion 9
We want to determine the effect of the interest rate i∗ on the household welfare.
At the steady state, the household welfare level is given by Eqs. W = U (c, d) =
u(c) + βv(d), with c and d given in the proof of Proposition of 1 in Appendix
B.36 The elasticity of the welfare level W with respect to the interest rate i∗ is
written as follows:
εWi = εUdεdi
(
1 +
Uc
Ud
dc/di
dd/di
)
, where
εdi(k) = εki(k)εdk(k)− 1, with
εki(k) =
εv + (εu/c
∗(k))
k [1− f ′(k)]
i∗η1(k) [1− γ(k)] −
i∗γ(k)
1 + i∗γ(k)
(εv − εsv(k)) εdk(k)
, and
εdk(k) =
f ′(k)
1− f ′(k)
1− α(k)
σ(k)
+ η2(k)
As dc/di = −di [εkii∗η1 (1− γ) + (εkiεdk − 1)] and dd/di = di [εkiεdk − 1],
we obtain:
εWi =
εv
1 + i∗γ
ν(η1)
(
εv − 2 i
∗γ
1 + i∗γ
)
+
εu
c∗
[1− f ′(k)] k (1 + i∗γ) + εdk (i
∗γ)2
1 + i∗γ
εdk(εsv − εv)
Because f ′(k) < 1, εu > 0 and εdk > 0 under Assumptions 1 − 4, the
numerator of εWi is positive for a sufficiently large η2 because εdk is increasing
in η2 (see Eq. (54)). Hence, εWi has the same sign as ε
s
v−εv under Assumptions
1− 6.
References
[1] Azariadis, C., and P. Reichlin (1996), “Increasing returns and crowding
out,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 20, 847-877.
[2] Benhabib, J., and G. Laroque (1988), “On competitive cycles in productive
economies,” Journal of Economic Theory 45, 145-170.
[3] Benhabib, J., S. Schmitt-Grohe´ and M. Uribe (2001), “The perils of Taylor
rules,” Journal of Economic Theory 96, 40-69.
[4] Bernanke, B. (2010), “Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble by Ben S.
Bernanke Chairman” At the Annual Meeting of the American Economic
Association, Atlanta, Georgia, January 3.
[5] Bernanke, B., and M. Woodford (1997), “Inflation Forecasts and Monetary
Policy,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 29, 653-84.
36For simplicity, the arguments of the functions are omitted.
38
[6] Bosi, S., and T. Seegmuller (2010a), “On rational exuberance,” Mathemat-
ical Social Sciences 59, 249-270.
[7] Bosi, S., and T. Seegmuller (2010b), “On the role of progressive taxation in
a Ramsey model with heterogeneous households,” Journal of Mathematical
Economics 46, 977-996.
[8] Bosi, S., and T. Seegmuller (2013), “Rational bubbles and expectation-
driven fluctuations,” International Journal of Economic Theory, forthco-
ming.
[9] Campbell, J. (2003), “Consumption-based asset pricing”, In: G. Constan-
tinides, M. Harris, R. Stulz (Eds.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance
(Amsterdam: North-Holland) 1B, 803-887.
[10] Campbell, J. and G. Mankiw (1989), “Consumption, income and inter-
est rates: reinterpreting the time series evidence,” In: O. Blanchard and
S. Fisher (Eds.) NBER Macroeconomics Annual (Cambridge MA: MIT
Press), 185-216.
[11] Cazzavillan, G., T. Lloyd-Braga and P. Pintus (1998), “Multiple steady
states and endogenous fluctuations with increasing returns to scale in pro-
duction ” Journal of Economic Theory 80, 60-107.
[12] Cazzavillan, G. and P. Pintus (2005), “On competitive cycles and sunspots
in productive economies with a positive money stock,” Research in Eco-
nomics 59, 137-147.
[13] Clain-Chamosset-Yvrard, L. and T. Seegmuller (2012), “Rational bub-
bles and macroeconomic fluctuations: the (de-)stabilizing role of monetary
policy,” AMSE Working Paper 2012-07.
[14] Crook, J. and S. Hochguertel (2005), “Household Debt and Credit Cons-
traints: Evidence from OECD Countries,” Credit Research Center, Uni-
versity of Edinburgh Working Paper Series No. 05/02.
[15] Diamond, Peter A. (1965), “National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth
Model,” American Economic Review 55, 1126-1150.
[16] Farhi, E., C. Sleet, I. Werning and S. Yeltekin (2012), “Nonlinear Capital
Taxation Without Commitment,” Review of Economic Studies 79, 1469-
1493.
[17] Farmer, R. E. A. (1986), “Deficits and cycles,” Journal of Economic The-
ory 40, 77-88.
[18] Grandmont, J.-M. (1985), “On endogenous competitive business cycles,”
Econometrica 53, 995-1045.
[19] Grandmont, J.-M. (1986), “Stabilizing competitive business cycles,” Jour-
nal of Economic Theory 40, 57-76.
39
[20] Grandmont, J.-M., P. Pintus and R. de Vilder (1998), “Capital-labour subs-
titution and competitive nonlinear endogenous business cycles,” Journal
of Economic Theory 80, 14-59.
[21] Guo, J. T., and K. Lansing (1998), ”Indeterminacy and Stabilization
Policy,” Journal of Economic Theory 82, 481-490.
[22] Hahn, F. and R. Solow (1995), A Critical Essay on Modern Macroeconomic
Theory, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
[23] Iacoviello, M. (2004), “Consumption, house prices, and collateral cons-
traints: a structural econometric analysis,” Journal of Housing Economics
13, 304-320.
[24] Jappelli, T. (1990), “Who is Credit Constrained in the US Economy?,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, 219-234.
[25] Kamihigashi, T. (2008), “The spirit of capitalism, stock market bubbles
and output fluctuations,” International Journal of Economic Theory 4,
3-28.
[26] LeRoy, S. and R. Porter (1981), “The present value relation: tests based
on variance bounds,” Econometrica 49, 555-584.
[27] Michel, P. and B. Wigniolle (2003), “Temporary bubbles,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 112, 173-183.
[28] Michel, P. and B. Wigniolle (2005), “Cash-in-advance constraints, bubbles
and monetary policy,” Macroeconomic Dynamics 9, 28-56.
[29] Rochon, C. and H. Polemarchakis (2006), “Debt, liquidity and dynamics,”
Economic Theory 27, 179-211.
[30] Saez, E. (2013), “Optimal progressive capital income taxes in the infinite
horizon model,” Journal of Public Economics 97, 61-74.
[31] Shiller, R. J. (1981), “Do stock prices move too much to be justified by
subsequent changes in dividends?” American Economic Review 71, 421-
436.
[32] Shiller, R. J. (1989), Market Volatility, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[33] Shiller, R. J. (2000), Irrational Exuberance, Princeton University Press,
Princeton.
[34] Sorger, G. (2005), “Active and passive monetary policy in an overlapping
generations model,” Review of Economic Dynamics 8, 731-748.
[35] Tirole, J. (1985), “Asset bubbles and overlapping generations,” Econome-
trica 53, 1071-1100.
40
[36] Wigniolle, B. (2012), “Optimism, pessimism and financial bubbles, ” CES
Working Paper 2012.05, University Paris 1.
[37] Woodford, M. (1999), “Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia,” Manchester
School 67, 1-35.
41
